Criminological Theories on Corporate Crime
Low Self Control vs. Organizational Theory
In 1990, Gottfredson and Hirschi developed the general theory of crime, which postulates that low self-control when paired with opportunity increases the probability that an individual will offend. Such characteristics of low self-control include impulsivity, risk seeking, volatile temper, self-centered, preference for simple tasks and physical activities (Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993).
On the other hand, organizational theory suggests that “… organizational influences on managerial decision making,” affect the probability of corporate crime occurring (Simpson & Piquero, 2002). More specifically, Finney and Lesieur’s (1982) organization theory assumes that the choice to commit a crime is determined through the process of rational thinking, particularly the managers understanding of the problem and the various costs and benefits of each possible solution (Simpson, et. al. 2002). Along with rational thinking, Finney and Lesieur argue that external strains, such as organizational performance pressures and barriers, can increase the probability of corporate crime.
On the other hand, organizational theory suggests that “… organizational influences on managerial decision making,” affect the probability of corporate crime occurring (Simpson & Piquero, 2002). More specifically, Finney and Lesieur’s (1982) organization theory assumes that the choice to commit a crime is determined through the process of rational thinking, particularly the managers understanding of the problem and the various costs and benefits of each possible solution (Simpson, et. al. 2002). Along with rational thinking, Finney and Lesieur argue that external strains, such as organizational performance pressures and barriers, can increase the probability of corporate crime.
Differential Association and Techniques of Neutralization
Differential association theory proposes that white-collar crimes, such as corporate crime, are the result of “…learned definitions and experiences that occur within the workplace” (Piquero, Tibbetts, & Blankenship, 2004). For example, when workers begin to adopt favorable definitions towards committing crime as opposed to unfavorable definitions, the likelihood of engaging in white-collar crime among employees increase. Such favorable definitions can be learned in the workplace by either colleagues and/or other influential groups (Piquero, et al., 2004). On the other hand, Sykes and Matza (1957) proposed techniques of neutralization as an explanation for juvenile delinquency. When applied to corporate crime, the theory suggests that employees learn ways to justify or neutralize their criminal behaviors, such as denial of responsibility, denial of injury, and/or denial of the victim (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Such techniques of neutralization would therefore allow employees to maintain a “non-criminal image,” while committing criminal acts (Piquero et al., 2004).
Control Balance Theory
Control balance theory as an explanation of criminality was proposed by Tittle in 1995. Control balance theory emphasizes the importance of the concept of control ratio, which is the “…ratio of control exercised relative to control experienced across any number of situational and global domains” in explaining criminal behavior (Piquero & Piquero, 2006). When the control ratio is imbalanced, which can be either a control surplus or control deficit, an individual is more likely to engage in criminal activity. Tittle also provides a list of contingencies that increase the probability of criminal behavior when control imbalance is present, including perceived risks and benefits (rational choice), and impulsivity (element of low self-control). When tested by Piquero and Piquero in 2006 using data collected on working adults, the authors found support that control surplus was associated with corporate crime behaviors (Piquero & Piquero, 2006).
Control balance theory as an explanation of criminality was proposed by Tittle in 1995. Control balance theory emphasizes the importance of the concept of control ratio, which is the “…ratio of control exercised relative to control experienced across any number of situational and global domains” in explaining criminal behavior (Piquero & Piquero, 2006). When the control ratio is imbalanced, which can be either a control surplus or control deficit, an individual is more likely to engage in criminal activity. Tittle also provides a list of contingencies that increase the probability of criminal behavior when control imbalance is present, including perceived risks and benefits (rational choice), and impulsivity (element of low self-control). When tested by Piquero and Piquero in 2006 using data collected on working adults, the authors found support that control surplus was associated with corporate crime behaviors (Piquero & Piquero, 2006).
Procedural Justice and Legitimacy
Tom Tyler’s (2006) procedural justice theory suggests that individuals will be more willing to follow the law if they perceive the criminal justice system to be legitimate (Walker, 2015, p. 316). Legitimacy in this context refers to a citizen’s perception that the criminal justice system is fair and just. Four sources of legitimacy include voice, neutrality, respect and trustworthiness (Mazerolle & Bennett, 2013, p.407). When applied to corporate crime, procedural justice theory suggests that corporations whom perceive regulations to be fairly enforced and have acknowledged the corporation’s perspective, the more likely they are to view such regulations as legitimate, and therefore, the less likely they are to violate them (Rorie, Simpson, Cohen & Vandenbergh, 2018). The study by Rorie and colleagues (2018) appears to support this theory only when corporate managers have direct contact with regulatory agencies.
Rational Choice Theory
Rational choice theory suggests that individuals will commit a crime when the benefits outweigh the costs. More specifically, the Paternoster-Simpson rational choice model of corporate crime predicts that corporate offenders are influenced by “… (1) the risks and benefits they perceive for themselves, (2) the risks and benefits they perceive for their firm or company, and (3) the presence or absence of offending inducements or restrictions within the specific context of the organization” (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Studies evaluating rational choice theory as an explanation of corporate crime have led to mixed results. Piquero, Exum and Simpson (2005) found that the desire for control found among a sample of managers and MBA students highly influenced their “interpretation of rational-choice considerations,” and was positively associated with corporate criminality (Piquero, Exum, & Simpson, 2005). On the other hand, Rorie (2015) found that both external and internal corporate policies impacted the cost-benefit analysis, similar to the findings of Paternoster and Simpson, who found that threats to punishment and appeals to morality where important factors in the rational-decision making process (Rorie, 2015; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996).
Rational choice theory suggests that individuals will commit a crime when the benefits outweigh the costs. More specifically, the Paternoster-Simpson rational choice model of corporate crime predicts that corporate offenders are influenced by “… (1) the risks and benefits they perceive for themselves, (2) the risks and benefits they perceive for their firm or company, and (3) the presence or absence of offending inducements or restrictions within the specific context of the organization” (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Studies evaluating rational choice theory as an explanation of corporate crime have led to mixed results. Piquero, Exum and Simpson (2005) found that the desire for control found among a sample of managers and MBA students highly influenced their “interpretation of rational-choice considerations,” and was positively associated with corporate criminality (Piquero, Exum, & Simpson, 2005). On the other hand, Rorie (2015) found that both external and internal corporate policies impacted the cost-benefit analysis, similar to the findings of Paternoster and Simpson, who found that threats to punishment and appeals to morality where important factors in the rational-decision making process (Rorie, 2015; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996).
Radical Theory
Radical theory of crime examines how “forms of inequality, oppression, and conflict affect crime and law” (Lynch & Stretesky, 2006). More specifically, the theory argues that the main conflict in society is between the ruling class, those who own the means of production, and the working class, those who are employed in production (Bernard, 1981). Because the ruling class has power over which criminal laws are passed, the social harms generated by the powerful are either not legally considered a crime, or their crimes go unchecked. Rooted in this conflict is capitalism, which radical criminologists argue must be overthrown if the conflict between the ruling and working class is to be resolved (Bernard, 1981). When applied to an explanation of corporate crime, radical theory argues that corporations are motivated by a capitalist economy to increase their means of production to further generate profit. Such desire to generate profit and minimize costs, leads corporations to engage in socially harmful acts, such as environmental pollution, manufacturing unsafe products, and/or generating unsafe working conditions for their employees. Since corporations are part of the ruling class, they have influence over which laws are passed and/or regulated, which often lead to corporate crimes being minimally regulated or punished. Other theories that fall under the umbrella of radical criminology include the treadmill of production theory and political economy theory (Lynch, 2013).
References:
Bernard, T.J. (1981). The Distinction Between Conflict and Radical Criminology. The Journal of
Criminal Law &; Criminology, 72(2), 362-379.
Finney, H. C. and Lesieur, H. R.: 1982, ‘A Contingency Theory of Organizational Crime’, in S. B. Bacharach (ed.),
Research in the Sociology of Organizations, Vol. 1, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 255–299.
Grasmick, H.G., Tittle, C.R., Bursik, R.J., and Arneklev, B.J. (1993). Testing The Core Empirical
Implications of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s General Theory of Crime. Journal of Research in
Crime and Delinquency, 30(1), 5-29.
Lynch, M.J. (2013). Political Economy and Crime: an Overview. Journal of Crime and Justice,
36(2), 137-147.
Lynch, M.J. and Stretesky, P.B. (2006). The New Radical Criminology and the Same Old
Criticisms.
Murphy, K., Mazerolle, L., & Bennett, S. (2013). Promoting trust in police: Findings from a
randomized experimental field trial of procedural justice policing. Policing and Society, 24,
405–424.
Paternoster, R. and Simpson, S. (1996). Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a
Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime. Law & Society Review, 30(3), 549-584
Piquero, N.L., Exum, M.L., and Simpson, S.S. (2007). Integrating the desire–for–control and
rational choice in a corporate crime context. Justice Quarterly, 22(2), 252-280.
Piquero, N.L. and Piquero, A.R. (2006). Control Balance and Exploitative Corporate Crime.
Criminology, 44(2), 397-429.
Piquero, N.L., Tibbetts, S.G, and Blankenship, M.B. (2005). Examining the role of differential
association and techniques of neutralization in explaining corporate crime. Deviant
Behavior, 26, 159-188.
Rorie, M. (2015). An integrated theory of corporate environmental compliance and
overcompliance. Crime, Law, and Social Change, 64, 65-101.
Rorie, M.L., Simpson, S.S., Cohen, M.A., and Vandenbergh, M.P. (2018). Examining Procedural
Justice and Legitimacy in Corporate Offending and Beyond-Compliance Behavior: The
Efficacy of Direct and Indirect Regulatory Interactions. Law & Policy, 40(2), 172-195.
Simpson, S.S. and Piquero, N.L. (2002). Low Self-Control, Organizational Theory, and Corporate
Crime. Law & Society Review, 36(3), 509-548.
Sykes, G.M. and Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency.
American Sociological Review, 22(6), 664-670.
Walker, Samuel. Sense and Nonsense about Crime, Drugs, and Communities. 8th ed., Cengage
Learning, 2015.
Authors: Daniela Oramas Mora, Michael Lynch, Leo Genco, Julianna Kirschner, and Troy Cardwell
USF S.P.R.U.C.E. Lab. (2019, November 9th) Corporate Crime, Online, Source Book, 2000-2017. Retrieved from https://sprucecorporatecrime.weebly.com
All rights reserved © 2019, 2020 USF S.P.R.U.C.E. Lab.
Bernard, T.J. (1981). The Distinction Between Conflict and Radical Criminology. The Journal of
Criminal Law &; Criminology, 72(2), 362-379.
Finney, H. C. and Lesieur, H. R.: 1982, ‘A Contingency Theory of Organizational Crime’, in S. B. Bacharach (ed.),
Research in the Sociology of Organizations, Vol. 1, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 255–299.
Grasmick, H.G., Tittle, C.R., Bursik, R.J., and Arneklev, B.J. (1993). Testing The Core Empirical
Implications of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s General Theory of Crime. Journal of Research in
Crime and Delinquency, 30(1), 5-29.
Lynch, M.J. (2013). Political Economy and Crime: an Overview. Journal of Crime and Justice,
36(2), 137-147.
Lynch, M.J. and Stretesky, P.B. (2006). The New Radical Criminology and the Same Old
Criticisms.
Murphy, K., Mazerolle, L., & Bennett, S. (2013). Promoting trust in police: Findings from a
randomized experimental field trial of procedural justice policing. Policing and Society, 24,
405–424.
Paternoster, R. and Simpson, S. (1996). Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a
Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime. Law & Society Review, 30(3), 549-584
Piquero, N.L., Exum, M.L., and Simpson, S.S. (2007). Integrating the desire–for–control and
rational choice in a corporate crime context. Justice Quarterly, 22(2), 252-280.
Piquero, N.L. and Piquero, A.R. (2006). Control Balance and Exploitative Corporate Crime.
Criminology, 44(2), 397-429.
Piquero, N.L., Tibbetts, S.G, and Blankenship, M.B. (2005). Examining the role of differential
association and techniques of neutralization in explaining corporate crime. Deviant
Behavior, 26, 159-188.
Rorie, M. (2015). An integrated theory of corporate environmental compliance and
overcompliance. Crime, Law, and Social Change, 64, 65-101.
Rorie, M.L., Simpson, S.S., Cohen, M.A., and Vandenbergh, M.P. (2018). Examining Procedural
Justice and Legitimacy in Corporate Offending and Beyond-Compliance Behavior: The
Efficacy of Direct and Indirect Regulatory Interactions. Law & Policy, 40(2), 172-195.
Simpson, S.S. and Piquero, N.L. (2002). Low Self-Control, Organizational Theory, and Corporate
Crime. Law & Society Review, 36(3), 509-548.
Sykes, G.M. and Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency.
American Sociological Review, 22(6), 664-670.
Walker, Samuel. Sense and Nonsense about Crime, Drugs, and Communities. 8th ed., Cengage
Learning, 2015.
Authors: Daniela Oramas Mora, Michael Lynch, Leo Genco, Julianna Kirschner, and Troy Cardwell
USF S.P.R.U.C.E. Lab. (2019, November 9th) Corporate Crime, Online, Source Book, 2000-2017. Retrieved from https://sprucecorporatecrime.weebly.com
All rights reserved © 2019, 2020 USF S.P.R.U.C.E. Lab.